If in the first attempt to create a world of free men we have failed, we must try again. The guiding principle that a policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy remains as true today as it was in the nineteenth century.
-F. A. Hayek
People were in prison so that prices could be free.
-Eduardo Galeano
In 1973, which on many accounts represents the year zero of the neoliberal era, the American prison population reached its post-war low. At about 360,000 inmates in total, or roughly 100 convicts per 100,000 residents, the rate of imprisonment had been relatively stable for decades at what was increasingly being viewed by criminologists as its 'normal' social level (Wacquant, 2009: 115, 117) . With this stability in mind, a 1973 report submitted to President Richard Nixon by a national criminal justice body recommended freezing prison construction for a decade. In addition to a spare capacity of beds, the report cited ' overwhelming evidence' that incarceration did not lead to reform or rehabilitation, 'that these institutions create crime rather than prevent it' (qtd in Wacquant, 2009: 113) . Two years later, French sociologist Michel Foucault's Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la Prison (Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison) unveiled a historical narrative whereby the physical prison-which emerged in its modern form in the 17th century and whose social centrality was consolidated in the early 19th century-could now be considered the relic of a prior age. The prison had lost its preeminent purpose, according to Foucault (1977: 298) , owing to the diffusion of modern forms of institutional control across ' all the disciplinary mechanisms that function throughout society'. Over the latter half of the 1970s, in a series of lecture courses that would not be published until long after his death, Foucault (2008: 27 ) went on to revise and supplement this disciplinary narrative, constructing a history of 'the liberal art of government' focused around the concept of freedom. In an unusual step for him, Foucault brought this history explicitly up to date, devoting his lectures in the Spring of 1979 to the work of 'neo-liberal' thinkers in Europe and America in the period since World War II. It was in the ideas of these figures that Foucault located the outline of a postdisciplinary society. Neoliberalism would represent a governmental order in which the mechanisms of the market replaced the controlling apparatus of the state, and in which ' action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than on the players … in which there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals ' (Foucault, 2008: 260 ).
Foucault's intellectual dalliance with neoliberal ideas-was he, wasn't he, a neoliberal sympathiser?-has been the subject of much recent scholarly fascination (Mirowski, 2013; Dean, 2014; Zamora and Behrent, 2016) . Far less attention has been paid, however, to the fact that Foucault's overarching story about the intertwining fates of the prison, the disciplinary state, and freedom in late modernity-written avowedly as a 'history of the present' (Foucault, 1977: 31) -turned out to be quite misleading in its implications for his time and our own. Indeed, at the very moment Discipline and Punish appeared, incarceration rates in the United States shifted abruptly onto a steep upward curve. By 2000, the prison population had increased fivefold to almost two million inmates, many of them held in ' conditions of overpopulation that defy understanding' (Wacquant, 2009: xv) . The correctional industry had become the thirdlargest employer in a country that otherwise saw social expenditure slashed. Under the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton, welfare was transformed into 'workfare', the obligation for unemployed citizens to accept any job offered to them, no matter how demeaning, underpaid, or unskilled. For the penal theorist Loïc Wacquant (2009: 292) , the closing decades of the 20th century witnessed nothing less than a wholesale transformation in the ideology and practice of welfare and 'prisonfare':
The operant purpose of welfare has shifted from passive 'people processing' to active 'people changing' … while the prison has traveled in the other direction, from aiming to reform inmates (under the philosophy of rehabilitation, hegemonic from the 1920s to the mid-1970s) to merely warehousing them (as the function of punishment was downgraded to retribution and neutralization). This retributive turn, over a period during which crime itself was not increasing, should be seen as part of a coherent governing philosophy, a 'new politics and policy of poverty ' (Wacquant, 2009: 287) . In the American context, this constituted a politics of racial and class warfare, since it was precisely those lower-class citizens (mostly black and Latino) who had formerly been on welfare rolls who were now being sent to prison instead.
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The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once famously remarked that ' economics are the method: the object is to change the heart and soul' (Thatcher, 1981: n. pag.) . In the US, Britain, and many other societies in the Global North, those hearts and souls that could not be changed by neoliberalism's economic methods were, it seems, made unfree by its punitive ones.
2 Meanwhile, in the Global South, neoliberalism and unfreedom were even more deeply intertwined in practice. As Naomi Klein outlines in her bestselling book The Shock Doctrine, the imposition of neoliberal 'reforms' in Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa came about not through the decisions of free democracies, but through the actions of dictatorships, nondemocratic governments, and international non-governmental organisations-the IMF, the World Bank-all underpinned by ' a powerful ruling alliance between a few very large corporations and a class of mostly wealthy politicians' (Klein, 2009: 15 In Hayek's view, not only was the free market the great economic and political achievement of the 19th century, it was also the most advanced epistemological system available to humans. The price mechanism, he argued, combined the knowledge of countless individual minds into a spontaneous, organic, and efficient system of resource allocation. If we understand economic freedom to be the principal mode of individual freedom, then the free market constitutes the only bulwark against the neo-feudalist threat of contemporary 'planning'. laws that appeared to abolish our freedom had in one way or another to be reconciled to freedom'. 5 The identification of economic freedom as the paradigmatic mode of freedom, and the consequent extension of economic models into previously non-economic spheres of life, is a key distinguishing factor between classical liberalism (in which spheres of social reproduction were understood to exist outside the market) and neoliberalism (in which markets should operate in virtually every sphere). See Brown argued that the response of the neoliberal right in the US to the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s 'was not a return to the Fordist family wage (that particular nostalgia would be a hallmark of the left), but rather the strategic reinvention of a much older, poorlaw tradition of private family responsibility, using the combined instruments of 6 Hayek's vision of freedom as non-coercion can also usefully be contrasted with the republican conception of freedom as non-domination, as influentially theorised by Philip Pettit. For the classical liberal, it is only direct interference in the basic choices of a person that can deny them freedom, and thus any imbalance in power or wealth between contracting parties does not impinge on the freedom enjoyed by each party. For the classical republican, by contrast, a person who is subject privately to a master, or publicly to an arbitrary power-'say, the despotism of a prince or party; or the colonial rule of an imperial power'-is considered unfree, regardless of how much or little interference that person encounters in practice (Pettit, 2016: 7) . Domination can also be established through want: Pettit (2016: 14) cites a statement by Thomas Jefferson as the locus classicus of the republican critique of liberal freedom of contract: 'And with the laborers of England generally, does not the moral coercion of want subject their will as despotically to that of their employer, as the physical constraint does the soldier, the seaman, or the slave?' Despite his emphasis on coercion over want, Hayek's argument in The Road to Serfdom does shade into a critique of domination when the power in question is the socialist 'planner'. He is much more sanguine when it comes to capitalist modes of domination, arguing that for the losers in a competitive market society, their inequality is easier to accept 'if it is due to impersonal forces than when it is due to design' (Hayek, 2007: 137) . For more on Hayek's conception of freedom, and its relationship to his epistemology of the market, see Paul (1980) . welfare reform, changes to taxation, and monetary policy'. The effect of these policy shifts has been to entangle the contemporary subject with capitalist financialisation in a way that ultimately undermines the very freedom in whose name these policies have been adopted. David Graeber (2013: 376) has connected the promise of home ownership, a central plank in the neoliberal reforms of Thatcher and Reagan, to the vast expansion of mortgage-refinancing schemes and consumer credit since the 1970s, commenting that 'for many, "buying a piece of capitalism" slithered undetectably into something indistinguishable from those familiar scourges of the working poor: the loan shark and the pawnbroker'. Even for those who could afford to save rather than borrow, a heightened engagement with financial markets became inescapable. Christian Marazzi (2008: 38) , for instance, notes that 'the diversion of savings to securities markets, initiated by the "silent revolution" in pension funds', had as its aim 'to eliminate the separation between capital and labour implicit in the Fordist salary relationship by strictly tying workers' savings to processes of capitalist transformation/restructuring'.
The point of these shifts away from the Fordist social order is to produce workers and citizens who are invested in the success of capitalism not only insofar as it guarantees the income they receive in the form of wages, but also to the extent that the financial mechanics through which capitalism operates underpin any future prosperity. Their freedom thus becomes dependent not only upon economic growth-as was also the case during the various Keynesian settlements of the postwar period-but on a growth that can only be guaranteed through a reorientation of life towards the management of credit and debt. For the working and middle classes in the era of neoliberal financialisation, freedom has thus become hedged all around by virtually unavoidable entanglement with indebtedness. When it comes to shackling neoliberal subjects to an understanding of freedom that appears to require their accommodation to structures of debt, no less important than these structural and policy shifts have been the ideological shifts that accompanied them. Remarking on the neoliberal ' exaltation of a life in uncertainty as a life in liberty ', Wolfgang Streeck (2017: 46) suggests that: 8 According to Harvey (2005: 41-2) , this was because it proved difficult, within the context of such movements, to 'forge the collective discipline required for political action to achieve social justice without offending the desire of political actors for individual freedom'. While neoliberalism's conceptualisation of liberty was, in theory, really quite minimal, in practice it was sufficiently diffuse and pragmatic as to be capable of neutralising and even arrogating movements that had the potential to challenge it. From our historical vantage point, it seems clear that neoliberalism has, in Adam Tooze's (2018: n. pag.) words, repressed 'the impulse to know, the will to intervene, the freedom to choose not privately but as a political body'.
From here it is a short step to Harvey's more brazen contention that the retreat from a class-based politics was ultimately the handmaiden of neoliberalisation. Yet it should be noted that he is emphatic in arguing that it is pointless to 'wax nostalgic for some lost golden age when some fictional category like "the proletariat" was in as an alternative to the contemporary status quo (Brouillette, 2017: 277-81; McClanahan, 2017) . 10 Philip Mirowski (2013: 107) goes so far as to argue that the products of the technology industry have altered the very notion of a consistent self, making a more embedded and temporally extended conception of freedom-which could challenge neoliberalism's minimal model of freedom from ability of neoliberal ideologues to reposition precarity as freedom in a way that is ideologically persuasive across a broad cross-section of political constituencies continues to be remarkable, and may explain why so few critics have been fully willing to claim the concept of freedom for the left. '. 12 In South America, the association between neoliberal economics and the tyranny of state violence never really disappeared, since the latter was so visibly the means by which the former was instantiated in this part of the world. In Africa, the apparent failure of IMF-sanctioned structural adjustment programmes to fulfil Amartya Sen's (2001) prospectus of development as freedom has resulted in a growing number of critiques. In Europe, a combination of asset-inflating quantitative easing and deep cuts to social provision under the governing economic rubric of ' austerity' has produced a profound set of legitimacy crises at both national and supranational levels, considered below. And in the United States, scholars and activists have continued to question the neoliberal ' centre' ground, while there has emerged an increasingly visible division between right-wing libertarian and populist movements -the Tea Party and Donald Trump -and left-wing social justice and democratic socialist movements -Black Lives Matter and Bernie Sanders.
Beaumont and Kelly: Freedom after Neoliberalism 13 neoliberal subjects are encouraged to cathect to a promise of freedom that cannot possibly be delivered upon. For instance, Sara Ahmed (2010: 234) argues that 'the freedom to be happy is a fantasy of freedom that conceals how happiness directs us towards some life choices and not others'. This affective logic has been harnessed to discipline and quiesce subjects who might otherwise begin to question it, an insight that underpins Lauren Berlant's influential concept of ' cruel optimism'. 'Why', Berlant (2011: 2) asks, ' do people stay attached to conventional good-life fantasies-say, of enduring reciprocity in couples, families, political systems, institutions, markets, and at work-when the evidence of their instability, fragility, and dear costs abounds?' One answer she points to concerns the 'gaps of disappointment' that opened up when '[f]lexibility was sold as a freedom both for corporations responding to an increasingly dynamic or unstable economy and for people who saw being tied down to jobs as a hindrance both to pleasure and to upwards mobility' (Berlant, 2011: 169, 201 ). Harvey's call for us to be sceptical about neoliberalism's claims regarding freedom was, in fact, being answered even before he articulated it; what has changed in recent years is the precision with which these answers have been attached, within cultural discourse, to the failure of neoliberalism to realise its own promises. revisited his earlier work on governing through freedom only to end his paper by arguing that the most important concept for the contemporary moment is not 'freedom' but 'security'. 14 In making the case for the continued significance of freedom, we therefore find ourselves-rather unusually-positioned against a highprofile contributor to the very project we ourselves have established. Yet we remain convinced-and this collection takes as its point of departure-that reconsidering and re-evaluating the meaning of freedom in a contemporary setting can provide a way not only to explore, in Rose's (2017: 318, 319) words, the 'new rationalities' of the present, but also to locate 'their potential for progressive re-articulation'.
Before moving to describe the essays in this special collection that seek to reconsider and re-evaluate the meaning of freedom, it is important to clarify that we are not arguing that the present era exists ' after' neoliberalism in any clear temporal sense. Rather, the essays included here constitute acts of historical imagination, conducted in the main through the study of recent literary texts that themselves stage imaginative projects in which the idea of an ' after' is engaged-sometimes negatively, sometimes positively-while proceeding from the recognition of contemporary neoliberal conditions. Rather than attempt to summarise what this ' after' signifies, then, we leave it to the individual essays to make their own arguments via their own aesthetic engagements.
But this aesthetic element may also need some explanation: why should we look to literature (or to cognate aesthetic fields) in order to imagine freedom after neoliberalism? We have already acknowledged that culture is one of the means by which neoliberalism established its ' empire of freedom', so it stands to reason that cultural texts-including literature, film, and even popular examples of 'theory'-played a significant role in this process. There has long existed a body of critical material that positions 'the cultural turn' in the humanities and social sciences as a left-neoliberal canard which substituted a depoliticised identitarianism 14 The conference-which emerged from a project run by the co-editors of this special collection between 2015 and 2017-was organised by three PhD students at the University of York, Adam
Bristow-Smith, Harriet Neal, and Joe Rollins. Details of the conference and the wider project are available at: freedomafterneoliberalism.wordpress.com.
for substantive ideological disagreement (Badiou, 2001; Michaels, 2004) . More recently, some on the left have condemned ' cultural' Marxism as a profound historical error, sought to renounce its origins in the poststructuralist inheritance of phenomenology, and called for the development of an 'ultra-realism' in its stead (Hall and Winlow, 2015 ). Yet it is notable that, even where scepticism regarding the cultural turn is heard, literary studies and its cognate fields continue to produce some of the most robust and productive critiques of capitalism broadly and neoliberalism in particular. If, as Sarah Brouillette (2015: 5, 14) argues, literature of the neoliberal period has been complicit in valorising 'the reflexive individual's enterprising and expressive labor', it has also offered us 'more tangled forms of self-consciousness, far distant from any celebratory self-appreciation'. And if cultural production under neoliberalism has incubated the paradigmatic post-Fordist labourers of the ' creative class' (Florida, 2002) , it is aesthetic criticism that has tended to offer the most subtle, sustained, and responsive critiques of not only the cultural products in question but also the economy from which they emerge. arguing that we do not today live in a period after neoliberalism, he nonetheless uses the collection's title as an occasion to critique neoliberalism's ' cynical presentism [,] in which time seems to stand still and change seems impossible'. For Clare, the temporality hinted at by our title resonates with the temporality of Ben Lerner's 2014 novel 10:04, a text that offers an immanent critique of neoliberal time by emphasising the ways in which the everyday present, 'if properly attended to', functions as a reservoir of affective potentiality. The identification of such a form of potentiality, Clare argues, undermines the temporality of neoliberalism-most visible in the temporality of debt-wherein freedom is made equivalent to a future of dramatically limited options that, in reality, are so limited as to represent no freedom at all.
What is most promising about this critique is that, in order to locate freedom after neoliberalism, it suggests that it is not actually necessary to be ' because it is a system that no longer seeks credibility in the way that hegemonies used to do, through a degree of cultural or normative consensus'. 'Freedom' was the term that underpinned the credibility and hegemony of neoliberalism in its ascendant phase. Our collection contends that it is high time to recapture this key idea as a resource for immanent critique and a route to a different future.
